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Effectiveness of safety-based incentives in Public Private Partnerships: 
Evidence from the case of Spain 
Thais Rangel , José Manuel Vassallo , Blanca Arenas 
Many countries around the world are implementing Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) con-
tacts to manage road infrastructure. In some of these contracts the public sector introduces 
economic incentives to the private operator to foster the accomplishment of social goals. 
One of the incentives that have been introduced in some PPP contracts is related to safety 
in such a way that the better the safety outcome the greater will be the economic reward to 
the contractor. The aim of this paper is at identify whether the incentives to improve road 
safety in highway PPPs are ultimately effective in improving safety ratios. To this end Pois-
son and negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from 
highway sections in Spain. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly 
influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Aver-
age Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles, the implementation of safety 
incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and 
accidents. 
1. Introduction 
Many countries around the world are seeking new means to involve the private sector in managing and financing infra-
structure through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). Three reasons lay behind this trend: the growing budgetary constraints, 
the search for greater productivity efficiency, and the improvement of quality through a better allocation of risks and incen-
tives (OECD, 2008). One of the most common ways of implementing PPPs in managing infrastructure is through the conces-
sion approach, which consists basically in transferring final design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the 
infrastructure to a private consortium, in exchange for the right to charge a fee to the user or to the government on behalf 
of the user, for a period of time contractually agreed in advance (Vassallo and Gallego, 2005). 
Concession contracts should include the necessary provisions in order that the relationship between the public and the 
private sector work at their best throughout the life of the contract. To this end, the bidding terms and contracts should com-
ply with two requirements: first, ensuring that the most efficient bidder in terms of price and quality will be granted the 
contract; and second, providing incentives to the contractor to render the highest quality level compatible with a reasonable 
cost. 
One of the key aspects of PPPs is precisely to encourage the private sector to manage and operate the infrastructure in the 
best way. To this end, in recent years, PPPs have been evolving from mere demand-based contracts to service-based con-
tracts that refer to different aspects such as availability, congestion, state of the pavement, safety, and so on. Consequently, 
the revenues for the contractor tend to depend more and more on performance-based standards rather than on traffic de-
mand (Harding et al., 2010). 
Two reasons lie behind this trend. First, PPP contractors can manage better the service performance they offer than the 
ultimate traffic flows on the infrastructure. And second, by encouraging the PPP contractors to provide a better service, by 
aligning the social with the private benefits, they will end up producing a more efficient outcome for society. 
The aim of this paper is to identify whether incentives to improve road safety in PPPs, by controlling other variables that 
may influence road safety, are ultimately effective at improving safety ratios. We propose a methodology, to analyze the ef-
fect of safety incentives on road safety in highway PPPs. The results showed that there are more fatalities, injuries and acci-
dents on road segments without incentives when they are compared with other segments with incentives. 
Apart from the introduction, the paper contains six additional sections. In Section 2, right after the introduction, we describe 
the practical experience in the introduction of safety incentives in highway PPPs. In Section 3, we give a literature review of the 
models explaining the variables influencing road safety ratios. In Section 4, we define the methodology we have implemented 
in this research and the data sources used for the empirical analysis. In Section 5, we show the main results of the model to-
gether with our comments. In the sixth and last section, we list our main conclusions and approach further research. 
2. Road Public Private Partnerships in Spain 
Spain turns out to be a good example for this research because both public and private highways coexist in the network. 
The highway capacity network has been developed on the basis of either public highways or private highways—most of them 
toll concessions—depending on the government in office. 
The first interurban highways in Spain were developed on the basis of toll concessions funded solely by the private sector. 
Between 1967 and 1975, the Spanish government granted 2042 km of toll highway concessions. The results of the imple-
mentation of concession contracts in Spain during this period were rather controversial. On the one hand, toll highway con-
cessions achieved the goal of providing the country with a modern highway network at a time when the public budget of 
Spain was not sufficient to afford such a huge cost. On the other hand, the guarantees made by the government to concession 
funding over time became very costly for the country (Izquierdo and Vassallo, 2004). 
From 1976 to 2005 no highway concession was awarded in Spain. There were several reasons for this. First, the two oil 
crises in the 1970s destabilized the Spanish economy. Second, after Franco's death, the political atmosphere in Spain was 
uncertain. Third, and most important, the Socialist government, which took office in 1982 and remained until 1996, was 
politically opposed to promoting private concessions as a means of financing highways. 
The socialist government continued expanding the highway network by building free highways on the basis of conven-
tional public procurement. These free publicly built highways were called in Spain autovías. This term has been used in Spain 
since then on as a means to label free highways and distinguish them from toll highways (autopistas). The autovías are built, 
funded and managed by the Spanish government. None of the public highways (autovías) have economic incentives to im-
prove road safety though the government is committed to building and maintaining them according to the standard proce-
dures approved by the Ministry of Public Works. 
The first autovías in Spain were built by doubling lanes out of single carriageways. The characteristics of these highways 
(known as first generation autovías) have alignment standards below those of toll highways. From 2000, the alignment stan-
dards of new autovías were improved notably to make them comparable with toll highways. These are called second gen-
eration autovías. This is the reason why we distinguish first generation autovías from second generation autovías in the 
road operation RO variable. 
Consequently, we distinguished toll highways and second generation autovías, which have similar alignment design stan-
dards from first generation autovías. 
In 1996, the conservative People's Party took office in Spain. The need to contain Spain's public deficit was the most dif-
ficult challenge facing the new government. This was the main reason why the new government decided to implement once 
again the policy of offering concessions to encourage the participation of the private sector in financing new transportation 
infrastructures. From 1996 until the time of writing, 1003 km of new toll highways concessions have been awarded by the 
central government of Spain through this approach. 
From 1996 to the present, the government has promoted both free public highways (autovías) and toll highway conces-
sions. Toll highway concessions are usually implemented in richer regions of the country where the possibility of raising rev-
enue to make the business viable for the public sector is greater. 
3. Safety-based incentives in Public Private Partnerships 
The revenues obtained by private contractors managing PPP contracts have been traditionally linked to the level of traffic 
rather than to performance-based requirements. However, in the last few years most PPP contracts have been used to pro-
mote and introduce incentives tied to bonuses and penalties to foster the contractor to provide the optimal quality levels in 
terms of several factors such as availability, state of the pavement, safety, etc. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
have mostly replaced the demand-based approach (Debande, 2002) by the performance-based approach. Other countries, 
such as Spain, have incorporated bonuses and penalties tied to performance-based standards in many of their PPP contracts 
(Delgado et al., 2007). 
These performance-based incentives, however, have to be introduced in the right way in PPP contracts. To that end, the 
marginal reward to the contractor for reaching a certain quality level should never be larger than the marginal social benefit 
produced at that level. The contractor should provide a quality level at the point where the marginal revenue obtained due to 
a certain quality increase equals to its marginal cost. If the incentives are defined this way, the contractor will be encouraged 
to provide the best service compatible with its production costs (Vassallo, 2007). 
Europe is the world region with the greatest tradition in incorporating performance-based incentives in PPPs. Spain, Fin-
land, Hungary, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom have introduced positive incentives based on explicit road safety 
indicators. Positive incentives mean that the contractor will be rewarded if it performs above the standards required. Italy 
introduced price-caps tied to road safety indicators in such a way that the concessionaire is allowed to set higher tolls if the 
safety ratios become better. In Ireland, PPP road contracts include some road safety indicators but they do not provide bo-
nuses. In other countries, like Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium, new and sophisticated PPP contracts have been imple-
mented, but they do not have positive incentives based on explicit road safety indicators. 
The design of the road safety indicators is quite heterogeneous across different PPP programs. There are differences both 
in the variables adopted to measure the outcome, in the way to set the threshold beyond which the contractor will be re-
warded or penalized, and in the economic incentives used to reward and penalize the contractor. To measure the outcome, 
most of the PPPs use the number of injuries, number of fatalities or a combination of the number of light accidents, serious 
accidents and fatal accidents. 
Including the exposure to the risk, expressed by traffic, is a generalized practice. In fact, only the first British shadow toll 
roads contracts did not introduce traffic. The rest of the contracts we have had access to take into account traffic by dividing 
the initial accident data by the annual traffic in terms of billion vehicles-kilometers. E18 road (Muurla-Lohja) in Finland, M6 
road in Hungary, several PPPs in Portugal (the IP-4, for instance) and the latest PPP roads awarded in Spain use this 
methodology. 
The benchmark to determine bonuses and penalties in highway PPP contracts is usually established in terms of the per-
formance of similar highways. These similar highways are usually characterized in terms of the annual average daily traffic. 
If the safety indicator of the highway PPP evaluated is above a certain percentile of comparable highways the contractor will 
have the right to be rewarded and vice versa. The aim of this approach is to control the general evolution of casualties by 
many factors, most of which are not manageable by the road operator. There are many examples of the implementation 
of this approach: E-18 road (Grimstad - Kristiansand) in Norway, the latest PPP roads awarded in the United Kingdom 
(for example, Al and M25) and some PPP roads in Spain (like the M-407 highway). 
Regarding the method of rewarding or penalizing the contractor, we have basically identified two trends: incentives re-
lated to the extension of the contract period of the project, and incentives related to increase of the toll or fee to be paid to 
the PPP contractor. 
4. Models that identify variables influencing road safety: a literature review 
In order to establish a methodology to evaluate the impact that safety-based incentives have in the final safety outcomes, 
we need to know the models used to identify variables influencing road safety. In this section we explore the latest trends in 
road safety modeling and determine the main variables influencing road safety. 
4.1. Accident prediction models 
Although the ordinary least square regression model (OLS) is applied in the road safety literature (Zlatopher, 1988; Hakim 
et al., 1991), some other authors have questioned its suitability (Jovanis and Chang, 1986; Miaou et al., 1992; Miaou and 
Lum, 1993). This method assumes that the dependent variable is continuous and normally distributed with a constant 
variance. This technique lacks the distributional property necessary to describe adequately random, discrete and non-
negative events such as traffic accidents. The statistical results derived from these OLS models are therefore questionable. 
One concern in using multiple linear regressions is that the number of traffic accidents may not have a normal distribution 
but instead follow a Poisson distribution. The relationships using the Poisson distribution have been developed by means of 
the technique of Generalized Linear Models (GLMs). 
Although the Poisson regression represents a significance advance in modeling accidents, this method has the assumption 
that the variance of a Poisson distribution is equals to its mean. However, the variance of traffic accidents are often larger 
than the mean. The negative binomial (NB) model is an extension of the Poisson model to overcome possible overdispersion 
in the data (Miaou and Lum, 1993; Noland and Oh, 2004; Chang, 2005; Caliendo et al., 2007; Arenas et al., 2009). 
4.2. Dependent and independent variables 
Accident frequency (number of accidents per year) and accident rates (number of accidents per million vehicle-kilome-
tres) are the most appropriate dependent variable for predictive models. 
Many independent variables affect crashes such as traffic flow, section length, weather, geometric characteristics, speed 
limits and human behavior. Researchers generally extract a reduced number of variables for inclusion in the proposed model. 
From an empirical stand-point, the relationship between accident frequency and traffic flows can be found in Abdel-Aty 
and Essam Radwan (2000), Persaud et al. (2000) and Anastasopoulos and Mannering (2009); and the relationship between 
accident rate and traffic flow can be found in Vitaliano and Held (1991), Hauerand Bamfo (1997) and Hadi et al. (1995). The 
relationship between accident frequency or accident rate and traffic flow show a great variation in their results. 
Abdel-Aty and Essam Radwan (2000), Persaud et al. (2000) and Anastasopoulos and Mannering (2009), point out that 
accident frequency increases with AADT. On the other hand, Vitaliano and Held (1991) cannot detect any significant increase 
in the accident rate when AADT increases. According to Martin (2002) and Hauer and Bamfo (1997) the accident rate even 
decreases with an increasing AADT. Hadi et al. (1995) proposed several accident prediction models. The results show that 
accident rates increase with increasing AADT on roads having higher levels of traffic, while it decreases with AADT on roads 
with lower traffic volumes. 
Few authors have analyzed the effect of heterogeneous flows, and specifically the effect that the presence of heavy good 
vehicles (HGVs) in the traffic flow has on accidents. Hiselius (2004) analyzed the relationship between accident frequency 
and traffic flow in four different road types according to speed limit and road width in two conditions: homogenous and het-
erogeneous traffic. The results show that the expected number of accidents increases less than proportionally with the traffic 
flow, in the homogenous case. For the heterogeneous case, the expected number of accidents decreases with increasing num-
ber of trucks. According to Arenas et al. (2009), the expected number of accident increases with the addition of one vehicle in 
AADT (maintaining HGV constant), and increases with one additional HGV (maintaining AADT constant) when comparing 
high capacity roads to single carriageway roads. 
Other studies have been carried out in recent years to establish relationships between accidents and traffic characteristics 
and the frequency of intersections (Ivan and O'Mara, 1997), with environmental factor (Chang, 2005; Keay and Sommonds, 
2006; Caliendo et al., 2007), with geometric infrastructure characteristics (Hauer, 2004; Chang, 2005), with number of lanes 
(Milton and Mannering, 1998; Noland and Oh, 2004; Chang, 2005), and with speed limits (Ossiander and Cummings, 2002; 
Wong et al., 2005). 
4.3. Research gaps and contributions 
There is an abundant literature on road accident prediction models to investigate the effects that various variables may 
have on road safety. However, there are no references that simultaneously address the relationship between road safety and 
incentives given to the concessionaires or road safety and infrastructure management. As a result, there is at least one main 
reason for justifying this paper which is motivated by the need to quantify safety incentives on road safety in highway PPPs. 
The aim of this paper is to identify whether incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are ultimately effective to improve 
safety ratios. In this paper we applied Poisson and NB regression models to determine the relationship between road safety 
and a set of exogenous variables related to traffic flow, infrastructure management and characteristics of infrastructure 
which are explained in the next section. 
5. Methodology 
Since accident occurrences are discrete, non-negative and random events, the Poisson and NB regression models appear 
to be appropriate models. Besides, the statistical models most commonly used to explain the relationship between motor 
vehicle accidents and a set of predictor variables are the Poisson and NB regression models, as previously discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1. 
The Poisson distribution represents a significant advance at describing traffic accident data. However, it contains certain 
weaknesses. It assumes that the variance of the dependent variable is equal to its mean but in practice the variance of 
the traffic accident data tend to be larger than the mean. This extra variation is known as overdispersion and, if it is present, 
the estimated coefficients may be inefficient and the standard error is biased. The overdispersion does not affect the values of 
the model parameters, but can affect the Wald statistics or likelihood statistics for testing the hypothesis about the param-
eters. Thus, in order to take this into account, the more indicated model is the negative binomial regression (NB) which 
enables the variance of the dependent variable to differ from its mean. 
Both approaches (Poisson and NB regression models) have been widely used to analyze count data where the dependent 
variable is discrete and defined for non-negative integers corresponding to the number of events occurring in a given inter-
val. However, NB regression is preferred if overdispersion is observed, as is common in traffic accident data. 
In this paper Poisson and NB are applied to determine the relationship between three endogenous variables: fatalities, 
injuries and accidents; and a set of exogenous variables. These variables are related to traffic flow such as: (1) Average An-
nual Daily Traffic (AADT) and (2) percentage of heavy good vehicles (%HGV), infrastructure management and characteristics 
of infrastructure such as (3) road operation (RO), which reflects the way the highway is ultimately managed, (4) incentives 
(INC), which evaluates whether the private contractors have incentives or not to improve the safety if the highways are man-
aged by them, and (5) number of lanes in each stretch (LANES). 
This paper focuses on the evaluation of the effect of variables related to the infrastructure management: RO and INC on 
road safety. As far as the authors are aware, there are no previous works closely related to this approach. 
5.3. Data 
The models we calibrated in this research are based on data from year 2006. In 2006, there were 12,075 km of high-capac-
ity highways in Spain (Ministry of Public Works, 2006a). The population for the models is made up of road stretches from the 
Spanish high-capacity network, with an average length of road stretch being 7 km. 
5.?.?. Road operation 
The road operation (RO) variable corresponds to the operational differences of the highway network in Spain. 
The RO variable in the model is a categorical variable that takes a different value if the highway stretch is located in a toll 
highway (TH) concession, a first generation autovía (1AV), or a second generation autovía (AV). Toll highways are PPPs, while 
AV and 1AV are public highways. 
The main difference between these types of roads is that the private sector is responsible for the maintenance of toll high-
ways while the public sector is responsible for the maintenance of autovías (1AV and AV). Another difference between these 
two groups is that the legislation prohibits mopeds, tractors and bicycles from entering toll highways and second generation 
autovías. 
1AV have alignment standards below those of toll highways and AV. As mentioned before in Section 2, the alignment 
standards of new autovías (AV) were improved notably to make them comparable with toll highways. TH and AV have sim-
ilar alignment standards. 
Data for RO was obtained from information provided by the Ministry of Public Works and from a research done by Sán-
chez et al. (2006). 
5.3.2. Incentives 
The main reason offering incentives to contractors is to achieve government objectives such as an efficient traffic man-
agement, increase project demand, decrease accident rate, overall improve road conditions and so on. 
Most of the toll highway concessions implemented in the last few years in Spain include performance-based incentives 
consisting of contractual provisions to extend the contract duration up to four years if several performance-based indicators 
tied to quality aspects like queuing in toll plazas, congestion, state of the pavement, safety, and satisfaction of the users are 
ultimately fulfilled. 
Regarding safety, the PPP contractor can be granted an extension of the contract if safety indicators remain below an acci-
dent benchmark for similar highways. For this purpose the government measures on a yearly basis the Risk Index (RI) and 
Mortality Index (MI) of the highways and compare it with other highways with similar characteristics in terms of alignment 
and traffic flow. 
To know which segments had road safety incentives (INC) we analyzed each concession contract in force in 2006. The first 
Spanish concession contract awarded with implementation of road safety incentives was in 2002. We analyzed all of the con-
tracts from 2002 to 2006. 
INC is a dummy variable, which indicates the presence or not of incentives to improve safety in each stretch. 
5.3.3. Other variables 
For modeling, we selected exogenous variables that may potentially influence safety and do not depend on the conces-
sionaire's ability to manage the road. The objective was to know the relationship between incentives given to the concession-
aire and road safety controlled by the variables that the concessionaire cannot manage. These are: continuous variables such 
as (1) Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT), (2) percentage of heavy goods vehicles (%HGV) and (3) number of lanes for each 
stretch (LANES) plus the two selected variables that may explain any relation between PPPs and accidents, (4) road operation 
(RO) and (5) incentives (INC). 
Furthermore, as offset of the models we choose the vehicle exposure (vk), measured in millions of vehicle-kilometers as 
vkj = 365 /j AADTj/106, where AADT, and ls are respectively the Average Annual Daily Traffic and length (km) of road section j 
obtained from a traffic database. The vk variable was considered because accident counts are strongly influenced by expo-
sure levels. Vehicle exposure estimates the potential probability for a crash occurring (Qin et al., 2004). 
The response variables are number of fatalities, injuries and accidents. These data came from the police-reported accident 
data supplied by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2006). The traffic data was supplied by the Ministry of Public Works 
(2006b). The final database combines both accident and traffic data from these two different sources. 
Traffic flow (AADT) is counted as the number of vehicles through a fixed section in both directions. Portable counting 
instrument and permanent inductive loops were used to count the number of vehicles. %HGV was calculated from HGV 
and AADT, and LANES was calculated using the number of lanes and the length of each stretch. LANES is the mean weighted 
by length. 
5.3.4. Selection of stretches 
A total of 1042 road segments were extracted out of 6293 from the 2006 traffic map. The sample was made up of inter-
urban road stretches of the Spanish high capacity network both PPP highways (toll highways) and public highways 
(autovías). 
Table 1 
Road segment data. 
Road 
AV 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
operation Segments 
No 
With accidents 
275 
43 
60 
378 
Without accidents 
287 
266 
111 
664 
Total 
562 
309 
171 
1042 
% 
With accidents 
26.39 
4.13 
5.76 
36.28 
Without accidents 
27.54 
25.53 
10.65 
63.72 
Total 
53.93 
29.66 
16.41 
100 
Length (km) 
3790.46 
2285.02 
1372.24 
7447.72 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of endogenous variables by road operation and total. Year 2006. 
Variables 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Accidents 
Road operation 
AV 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
AV 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
AV 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
Mean 
0.18 
0.16 
0.14 
0.17 
4.43 
6.31 
3.38 
4.81 
2.51 
3.63 
1.90 
2.74 
S.D. 
0.62 
0.75 
0.52 
0.65 
9.48 
26.33 
10.21 
16.48 
5.30 
15.24 
4.92 
9.39 
Range 
6 
9 
4 
9 
97 
250 
102 
250 
50 
145 
36 
145 
Minimum 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Maximum 
6 
9 
4 
9 
97 
250 
102 
250 
50 
145 
36 
145 
Sum 
102 
48 
24 
174 
2488 
1951 
578 
5017 
1413 
1121 
325 
2859 
We excluded urban segments and segments without complete information for traffic flow and infrastructure variables. 
We considered stretches with and without accidents to avoid selection bias. The study includes PPPs (toll highways) and 
public highways (first and second generation autovías). The final data base represents 62% of the total Spanish high-capacity 
network. The total number of segments (with and without accidents) and the length by road operation are presented in 
Table 1. And 63.72% of the total segments had no accidents. 
The descriptive statistics of endogenous variables by road operation are presented in Table 2. The mean of injuries and 
accidents is higher for 1 AV than AV and TH. As we explained before 1 AV roads have design standards below AV and TH. How-
ever, the mean of fatalities is higher in AV than 1AV and TH. 
The descriptive statistics of exogenous variables by road operation, displayed in Table 3, indicate that the mean traffic 
intensity (AADT) is higher on 1AV than AV and TH. The low traffic intensity in TH could be explained because the users 
pay tolls. There is more heavy goods vehicle traffic on public highways (AV and 1AV) than PPPs (TH). The range and the stan-
dard deviation in AV and 1AV are higher than TH, which indicates more heterogeneity in traffic flow. 
The first descriptive statistics for the traffic variables AADT and %HGV indicated the need to use the logarithm transfor-
mation to expand low values and contract high values. The logarithmic transformation is used to stabilize the variance of a 
sample. The measures of central tendency take similar values through logarithm transformation. The natural logarithms of 
the explanatory variables (except for LANES) were used to minimize heteroskedasticity. After transformation, the range val-
ues (maximum and minimum) of AADT and%HGV variables were greatly reduced. The standard deviation is very low com-
pared with the mean; therefore, the distribution was further improved. The logarithmic transformation is shown in 
Appendix. However, the chi square goodness of fit test rejects the null hypothesis that the variables follow a normal 
distribution. 
6. Modeling results 
The Poisson overdispersion parameter indicates that the data may be overdispersed. When Pearson's chi-square divided 
by the degrees of freedom is greater than 1, the data may be overdispersed, otherwise the data may be underdispersed. 
Therefore, it was necessary to test the NB as an alternative model, which enables the variance of the dependent variable 
to differ from its mean. 
After testing several models, we ended up adopting the one that we show in this section. 
The general equation in a segment j , road operation (ROy = i) being R03j = AV the reference class, and the incentives sys-
tems to the concessionaire (INCy 1=yes\ 
' 0=no) 
E\Y,, • exp[ft log (AADTy) + ft log (%HGVy) + ft (LUJES,,) + 5,.(ROij) + fc,(INCj) + logivky; (1) 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of exogenous variables by road operation and total. Year 2006. 
Variables 
AADT 
%HGV 
LANES 
vk 
Road operation 
AV 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
AV 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
AV 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
AV 
1AV 
TH 
Total 
Mean 
23,686 
35,735 
16,508 
26,081 
18.53 
23.37 
10.35 
18.63 
4.16 
4.30 
4.29 
4.22 
52.28 
79.25 
42.51 
58.67 
S.D. 
21,876 
34,262 
12,950 
26,046 
10.12 
8.95 
5.39 
10.08 
0.87 
0.73 
0.85 
0.83 
56.22 
70.65 
42.91 
60.60 
Range 
139,040 
186,370 
58,093 
190,406 
72.40 
48.10 
32.60 
73.70 
6.00 
5.00 
6.00 
6.00 
450.65 
355.89 
248.92 
450.65 
Minimum 
1270 
5135 
1094 
1094 
2.80 
4.60 
1.50 
1.50 
2.00 
3.00 
2.00 
2.00 
1.05 
3.13 
1.75 
1.05 
Maximum 
140,310 
191,500 
59,187 
191,500 
75.20 
52.70 
34.10 
75.20 
8.00 
8.00 
8.00 
8.00 
451.70 
359.02 
250.67 
451.70 
Table 4 
Negative binomial regression models for fatalitites, injuries and accidents. 
Variables Measurement level Fatalities Injuries Accidents 
Intercept 
Log (AADT) 
Log (%HGV) 
INC 
LANES 
Road operation 
Log (vk) 
Deviance (Dp) 
Pearson Chi-Square (X2) 
Log likelihood 
AIC 
BIC 
Overdispersion parameter (k) 
Stretch with incentives 
Stretch without incentives 
TH 
1AV 
AV 
S 
3.622c (5.413) 
-0 .972 ' (49.535) 
-0.030 (0.028) 
-1.152 (1.093) 
0 
0.104 (1.339) 
-0.300(1.213) 
-0.244 (1.313) 
0 
1 
516,269 
1472.585 
-430.021 
874.043 
908.685 
1.423 
0.874 (1.755) 
-0 .276 ' (21.386) 
-0.438'(32.701) 
-0.792d (3.684) 
0 
0.145b (8.534) 
-0.376b (10.476) 
-0 .318 ' (13.566) 
0 
1 
2389.771 
4013.498 
-2274.830 
4563.660 
4598.303 
3.878 
-0.180 (0.063) 
-0.223'(11.893) 
-0 .478 ' (33.046) 
-1 .041 c (4.220) 
0 
0.166b (9.721) 
-0.358b (7.835) 
-0 .370 ' (15.776) 
0 
1 
1798.057 
2722.568 
-1822.464 
3658.928 
3693.571 
2.631 
Measure level: scale (S), categorical (C). 
' p< 0.001. 
b
 p<0.01. 
c
 p < 0.05. 
d
 p<0.10. 
where: E[Y¡j\ is the expected number of fatalities, injuries or accidents; AADTy is the Annual Average Daily Traffic; %HGVy is 
the percentage of heavy goods vehicles; LANESy is the number of lanes in each stretch; R0¡¡ is road operation which could be 
toll highway (TH), first generation autovía (1AV) and second generation autovía (AV); INCy reflects the introduction of road 
safety incentives in the stretch analyzed. This is a dummy variable, it takes 1 when the contract has safety incentives and it 
takes 0 when the contract does not have safety incentives; vky is the vehicle exposure measured in million of vehicle-
kilometers. 
Table 4 summarizes the estimated NB regressions. Each column refers to a model for each response variables (fatalities, 
injuries and accidents), while every row display the estimated parameters for the exogenous variables of the model. The sig-
nificance of coefficients was checked using Wald statistic (in brackets), which rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
is zero with a level of 95% confidence. Different goodness-of-fit statistics were used to select the model such as deviance, log-
likelihood and Pearson chi-square statistics. Other measures were also evaluated such as Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
(Akaike, 1974) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978). 
A criterion for variables inclusion was used by testing the likelihood ratio (LR). In addition, the correlation coefficient be-
tween them was prevented. Looking in detail at Table 4, we can highlight the following results, ceteris paribus: 
1. Log (AADT) is the most significant predictor variable for the fatality, injury and accident rates. The coefficient signs are 
negative for all models (fatalities, injuries and accidents), suggesting that a greater AADT is associated with lower rates 
for fatalities, injuries and accidents (ceteris paribus). 
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Fig. 1. Accident rates in relation to AADT. 
This result is also analyzed visually. Fig. 1 present the accident rates in relation to AADT, while maintaining %HGV con-
stant. Data presented in Fig. 1 indicates that the accident rates decreasing with an increasing of AADT on TM (with and with-
out incentives), AV and 1AV. This result confirms the hypothesis proposed by Vitaliano and Held (1991) and Hauer and 
Bamfo (1997) that accident rates decrease when AADT increases. 
2. Log (%HGV) was found to be statistically significant for injury and accident models. The coefficient signs are negative for 
all models. This means that the larger the percentage of heavy good vehicles (ceteris paribus) the smaller the injury and 
accident rates. This could be related to the speed reduction that heavy vehicles impose to light vehicles on the traffic flow. 
An increasing number of HGV accordingly slowdown the traffic because of two reasons: the speed limit for HGVs is lower 
than for light cars and HGVs could force the rest of vehicles to reduce the speed to maintain the safety distance, to ensure 
the visibility and enable drivers to have enough reaction time in case of an unexpected maneuver. 
This result is also analyzed visually in Fig. 2, which present the accident rates in relation to %HGV, while maintaining 
AADT constant. The visual analysis is not in conflict with the regression analysis, the accident rates decreasing with an 
increasing of %HGV on TM (with and without incentives), AV and 1AV This result is in line with Hiselius (2004), if this anal-
ysis was in terms of number of accidents. 
1. The LANES variable showed the expected positive signs in all models. This means that a larger number of lanes are 
associated with larger rates of fatalities, injuries and accidents (ceteris paribus). This variable was found to be statistically 
significant for injury and accident models. The reason for this is that in highways with more lanes the interactions 
between drivers is greater so the probability of crashing increases. This result is in line with the findings of Milton 
and Mannering (1998), Noland and Oh (2004) and Chang (2005) that the accident risk increases with the number of 
lanes. 
2. INC variable showed the expected negative sign, suggesting that establishing incentives in the contracts is associated 
with lower rates for fatalities, injuries and accidents (ceteris paribus). The coefficient signs do not change throughout 
the three models. This variable was found to be statistically significant for injuries (with a level of 90% confidence) 
and accidents (with a level of 95% confidence). 
3. RO indicates that there is a different behavior among toll highways, second generation autovías and first generation auto-
vías. Toll highways (TH) showed the expected negative sign in all models suggesting that there are fewer fatalities, inju-
ries and accidents in toll highways compared with AV (ceteris paribus), which is the reference class. In other words, toll 
highways managed and operated by the private sector turn out to be safer that free highways managed and operated by 
the public sector. The only odd result that we found in our analysis is that the variable 1AV has an unexpected negative 
sign suggesting that 1AV has fewer fatalities, injuries and accidents compared to AV. This result is strange because, as we 
mentioned earlier in this paper, first generation autovías (1AV) have poorer design standards than second generation 
autovías (AV). 
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Fig. 2. Accident rates in relation to %HGV. 
The reason we found for this unexpected result is that first generation autovías are among the busiest highways in Spain 
in terms of traffic so the AADT in these highways is closer to their capacity and consequently the speed of the flow is lower, 
which improves safety ratios. 
The expressions of accident rates for different road operations (RO) can be determined by the parameters estimated in 
Table 4. As one example, the equations of toll highways by segment (j) in specific scenarios are calculated in the following 
way: 
vk¡ (2) 
The average accident rates per million vehicle-kilometers are the following for toll highways segments with incentives: 
= 0.009 (3) 1TH = 0.243 (AADT)-0 223(%HGVr0478 
Whereas the average accident rates per million vehicle-kilometers are the following for toll highways segments without 
incentives: 
iTH = 0.690(AADT)-0223(%HGV)-0478 = 0.026 (4) 
From these expressions it can be clearly observed that the incentives given to the concessionaires have a positive impact 
on reducing accident rates. The accident rate per 1 million vehicle-kilometers is about 2.88 times higher in toll highways 
without incentives compared to toll highways with incentives. 
7. Conclusions and further research 
The most important result from this research is that setting up safety-based incentives in PPPs is an effective measure to 
manage highways. In other words, there are more fatalities, injuries and accidents on highway segments without incentives 
than on highway segments with incentives. This fact demonstrates that the implementation of road safety incentives in PPP 
is an effective measure to encourage the contractor to handle safety in a better way. 
We obtained this result because, in the case of Spain, we found that the INC variable is statistically significant for the in-
jury and accident models. The sign of the INC variables is also negative for the fatality models but it is not significant at the 
95%. This result suggests that accident and injury rates are better performance-measures to incentivize private operators 
than fatality rates. 
The safety incentives in Spain are not a substantial source of revenue for PPP contractors when compared with other 
countries such as Finland and United Kingdom. Even though safety incentives in Spain are small compared to other coun-
tries, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has had a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries 
and accidents. 
Table 5 
Logarithm transformation of AADT,%HGV and vk by road operation and total. Year 2006. 
Variables 
Road operation 
Mean 
S.D. 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
S.D. 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
S.D. 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
AADT 
AV 
23,686 
21,876 
139,040 
1270 
140,310 
%HGV 
18.53 
10.12 
72.40 
2.80 
75.20 
vk 
52.28 
56.22 
450.65 
1.05 
451.70 
1AV 
35,735 
34,262 
186,370 
5135 
191,500 
23.37 
8.95 
48.10 
4.60 
52.70 
79.25 
70.65 
355.89 
3.13 
359.02 
TH 
16,508 
12,950 
58,093 
1094 
59,187 
10.35 
5.39 
32.60 
1.50 
34.10 
42.51 
42.91 
248.92 
1.75 
250.67 
Total 
26,081 
26,046 
190,406 
1094 
191,500 
18.63 
10.08 
73.70 
1.50 
75.20 
58.67 
60.60 
450.65 
1.05 
451.70 
Log (AADT) 
AV 
9.77 
0.79 
4.70 
7.15 
11.85 
Log (%HGV) 
2.76 
0.57 
3.29 
1.03 
4.32 
Log (vk) 
3.49 
1.03 
6.07 
0.05 
6.11 
1AV 
10.19 
0.71 
3.62 
8.54 
12.16 
3.07 
0.44 
2.43 
1.53 
3.96 
3.92 
1.03 
4.74 
1.14 
5.88 
TH 
9.40 
0.83 
3.99 
7.00 
10.99 
2.20 
0.55 
3.13 
0.40 
3.53 
3.22 
1.16 
4.96 
0.56 
5.52 
Total 
9.83 
0.82 
5.17 
7.00 
12.16 
2.76 
0.60 
3.92 
0.40 
4.32 
3.57 
1.07 
6.07 
0.05 
6.11 
This paper has paved the way for new topics that undoubtedly would require further research. First, the analysis of the 
size of the economic incentive set up in the PPP contract on the ultimate improvement of safety ratios is a crucial aspect. 
Second, a cross-cutting comparison of the different types of incentives (i.e. incentives related to the deadline of the project 
vs. incentives related to payments) would be of the greatest interest. Third, an analysis of the evolution of safety performance 
over the years in highway PPPs with safety-based incentives would shed light on the long-term effectiveness of these 
incentives. 
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